© The Author 2011. Oxford University Press and New York University School of Law.
All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com.

..........................................................................................

Ran Hirschl*

The Nordic countries’ changing constitutional scenery is a largely unexplored paradise for
theory building in the field of comparative constitutional law and politics. As the articles in
this symposium illustrate, the Nordic countries provide what is, arguably, a most fitting test
case for examining the impact of transnational law on domestic constitutionalism, with its
patterns of global convergence alongside enduring national divergence. Likewise, the Nordic
experience calls for the incorporation of comparative politics or political economy theory
into the study of constitutional law. This is particularly true with respect to the empirical
examination of some core insights of post–World War II constitutional theory concerning
the origins of constitutionalization and judicial review and the supposedly critical role of the
latter in facilitating democracy and high levels of human development.

1. Nordic constitutionalism as terra incognita
The Nordic countries have often looked somewhat enigmatic, even inexplicable, to
outside observers. A bedrock of social democracy, political stability, and economic
prosperity for most of the past century, the region has nonetheless remained in some
important respects, exceptional. Having avoided much of the horror and destruction
of World War II, the Nordic countries remain torn with respect to European Union
membership (Denmark, Finland, and Sweden are EU members; at least for the time
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being, Iceland and Norway are not). And other dualities abound. Having adhered to
a policy of generous foreign aid alongside honest brokerage in global affairs, the Nordic
countries (in particular Denmark and Norway) are among the main protagonists in
the brewing international battle for the Arctic. The region that brought to the world
great winners such as Paavo Nurmi (renowned Finnish runner), Ingmar Bergman
(celebrated Swedish film director), or Roald Amundsen (legendary Norwegian explorer) is also the same region whose residents exemplify humility and undertone.
And whereas the Scandinavian welfare state has long been the paradigmatic example of successful Keynesianism, social democracy, and concern for the ordinary
person, the region has produced economic empires such as Nokia, Volvo, and IKEA,
alongside iconic enterprises of excellence and meritocracy such as the Nobel Prize.
Similar dualities characterize Nordic constitutionalism. In comparative law’s canonical genealogy of “legal families” the Nordic legal tradition is often classified as being
neither a pure civil law type of legal system (no emphasis on extensive codification)
nor a classic common law type (no heavy reliance on case law or precedent). Instead,
it is a bit of both. Sweden’s Age of Liberty (mid-18th century) was one of the earliest
experiments with meaningful parliamentary limits on the monarchy. The Constitution of Norway (adopted 1814) is the second-oldest constitution currently in existence.
Sweden’s 1809 constitution was replaced in 1974, at the age of 165. At the same time,
the Nordic countries have traditionally been agnostic, at best, toward American-style
high-voltage constitutionalism, rights talk, and judicial activism. Instead, deference
to the legislature side by side with administrative review on procedural grounds characterized Nordic judicial review for most of the last century. Another case in point is
the designation of the Evangelical Lutheran Church as the state church in Norway,
Denmark, Finland, and Iceland—probably some of Europe’s most liberal and progressive
polities. Norway’s head of state, for example, is also the leader of the church. Article 2
of the Norwegian Constitution guarantees freedom of religion but also states that
Evangelical Lutheranism is the official state religion. Article 12 requires that more than
half the members of the Norwegian Council of State be members of the state church.
Even with respect to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), arguably the main convergence engine in European rights discourse, the Nordic countries
have been speaking with an inconclusive voice. Having signed the ECHR in 1950
and ratified it in 1952, Norway, for example, deferred giving human rights explicit
constitutional protection until 1994.1 Prior to 2000, substantive judicial review of
legislation was explicitly forbidden in Finland.2 In Denmark and Sweden, nontechnical judicial review has seldom been practiced.3 The Danish Supreme Court has
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set aside legislation only once in the past 160 years, and the Danish Constitution is
silent on the issue.4 The picture is similar in Sweden.5 Variations on a combination
of well-established, ex ante parliamentary preview and restrained ex post judicial
review, deployed in the Nordic region, have proven effective in mitigating the countermajoritarian difficulty embedded in excessive judicial review and ensuring an alternative, nonjuristocratic way of going about protecting rights.6 In many respects, then,
the Nordic model of judicial review, not the so-called “commonwealth model,” is the
true, genuine weak-form judicial review.7
Yet, over the last few decades, the traditional Nordic reluctance vis-à-vis judicial
review has come under attack.8 The shift toward economic neoliberalism that took
place in the 1980s, alongside the changing character of global markets and a series
of international economic shocks, have eroded the traditional Scandinavian welfarestate model. All the talk about the adoption of an EU constitution and, in particular,
the Maastricht Treaty (1992) and the Lisbon Treaty (2009) has affected the political
and constitutional discourse in the three Nordic EU members, as well as in Norway
and Iceland. In particular, the emerging pan-European rights regime enforced by
the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has begun to affect constitutional
rights jurisprudence in the region following the incorporation of the ECHR into the
Nordic countries’ domestic law.9 In addition, the gradual weakening of the historic
social democratic dominance in Nordic politics and the emergence of a more competitive, multiparty political market alongside a rise in the number of litigation-oriented
interest groups has brought about an increased role for the courts in Scandinavian
politics.10 Cosmopolitan voices within the Nordic countries have been increasingly
successful in encouraging courts to jump on the pan-European rights discourse
bandwagon or risk being left intellectually and institutionally behind.11 In short, a
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2. Judicial review, democracy, human development
The past few decades have seen sweeping global convergence toward democracy, real
or professed, alongside a convergence upon constitutional supremacy and a corresponding increase in the political salience of constitutional courts and judicial review
worldwide. Over 150 countries and supranational entities, ranging from Russia to
South Africa to the European Union and covering approximately three-quarters of the
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combination of endogenous and exogenous pressures has pushed the Nordic countries
to join the march toward juristocracy.12
The unique combination of continuity and change makes the Nordic countries an
ideal setting for assessing some of the core insights of canonical constitutional theory.
Most notably, the traditional Nordic resistance to judicial hyperactivism alongside the
region’s exceptional record on both the democracy and human development fronts
provide ample material to assess the perception of judicial review as a necessary supplement to democracy and its supposed contribution to human development and good
governance. The Nordic countries also provide a perfect context for studying what
may be termed glocalization in constitutional law as well as the emergence of amalgams of the local and the global reflecting centripetal convergence processes alongside
patterns of enduring divergence. Likewise, it is difficult to think of a more suitable region for studying the links between economic liberalization, the reconstruction of the
welfare state, and the rise of judicial review and rights discourse. The constitutional
transformation of the Nordic countries may thus serve as a magnifying glass for similar
processes of constitutional change elsewhere. However, despite this intriguing set up,
constitutional events in the Nordic countries seldom generate international scholarly
interest. Surprisingly, none of the major works critical of judicial review’s legitimacy,
democratic credentials, or effectiveness in limiting government draws on the Nordic
experience to substantiate its claims. It is much less surprising, to be sure, that none of
Ronald Dworkin’s pro–judicial review works closely considers the possible lessons of
the Scandinavian model of judicial review. With few notable exceptions, the region’s
potential contribution to contemporary debates in comparative constitutional law
and politics remains, for the most part, unexploited and under-theorized.
In this essay, I offer several realist observations concerning the possible lessons from
Nordic constitutionalism with respect to two core questions. First, how necessary, let
alone sufficient, a condition is active judicial review, strong or weak, in accomplishing high levels of democracy, human development, and other such ideals? And, by
extension, what is the place of constitutional rights in the larger scheme of the modern
welfare state? Second, what are the links between economic liberalization and shifting political power constellations, on the one hand, and the rise of judicial review and
rights jurisprudence, on the other? With respect to each of these two questions, Nordic
constitutionalism offers a counternarrative to the canonical insights of constitutional
theory. I discuss each in turn.
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world’s population, have gone through major constitutionalization processes over the
last few decades. Even countries such as Canada, Israel, Britain, and New Zealand—
described merely two or three decades ago as the last bastions of Westminster-style
parliamentary sovereignty—have embarked on a comprehensive constitutional overhaul aimed at introducing principles of constitutional supremacy into their respective
political systems. The emergence of this new, all-encompassing form of managing
public affairs has been accompanied and reinforced by an almost unequivocal endorsement of the notion of constitutionalism and judicial review by scholars, jurists,
and activists alike. According to the generic version of this canonical view, judicial
review by constitutional courts is a necessary supplement and a core element of a viable
democracy.
To be sure, the sweeping worldwide convergence to constitutionalism has brought
about tremendous advances—real and symbolic—in the legal protection and public
awareness of basic rights and liberties. And it has certainly entrenched in the public
mind the notion that there is far more to democracy than a mere adherence to the
majority-rule principle. That said, simple and sweeping claims about the positive
effects of the constitutionalization of rights ought to be taken with a grain of salt.
Whereas the constitutionalization of rights, no doubt, affirms marginalized identities
or promotes the status and awareness of procedural justice and negative liberties, its
independent influence on promoting progressive notions of democratic or distributive
justice appears somewhat exaggerated. If there is a region whose experience supports
such a skeptical view of constitutionalism and judicial activism, it is Scandinavia.
While an exhaustive empirical study of the effect of constitutionalism on democracy is, of course, beyond the scope of this essay, some crude yet valuable information is easily available. The Democracy Index, conducted by The Economist, focuses on
five general categories of democracy: electoral process and pluralism, civil liberties,
functioning of government, political participation, and political culture. Regimes are
assigned a score on a zero-to-ten scale, where ten is the closest a country can get to full
democracy. North Korea scored the lowest with 1.08, while Norway scored a total of
9.80 (the highest result). The rest of the top dozen countries include Iceland, Denmark,
Sweden, New Zealand, Australia, Finland, Switzerland, Canada, the Netherlands,
Luxemburg, and Ireland. The United States was ranked seventeenth with a score of
8.18. In other words, the four most democratic countries in the world are Nordic
countries, with the fifth Nordic country (Finland) ranked the seventh most democratic
country worldwide. The countries are categorized into “Full Democracies” (score of
8–10); “Flawed Democracies” (score of 6–7.9); “Hybrid Regimes” (score of 4–5.9);
and “Authoritarian Regimes” (score of less than 4). Of the 167 countries studied, 26
were designated full democracies, 53 flawed democracies, 33 hybrid regimes, and 55
authoritarian regimes. Judging by this study, Western countries—primarily Northern
European, plus Canada, New Zealand and Australia—all with relatively small populations (up to 30 million or so), developed market economies, central regulation in most
key policy areas (e.g., education, health care, transportation, agriculture etc.), and
a relatively generous Keynesian welfare-state tradition, are clearly the most democratic countries in the world. And yes, none of the top twelve countries on the list
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sport a long tradition of U.S.-style written constitutionalism, active judicial review, or a
culturally engrained constitutional sanctity. To reiterate: we can count all five Nordic
countries among the seven most democratic countries in the world. In other words,
American-style constitutional faith is not a necessary precondition for democracy.
Even the independent freedom-enhancing aspects of the U.S. Constitution are not
obvious. Whereas certain rights and liberties enjoy venerable constitutional protection, the United States has one of the most unequal distributions of income among
advanced industrial societies; it has vast social and economic disparities, and sports
one of the more hospitable constitutional environments for economic entities and corporate capital. Sweden, Finland, Norway, and Denmark—four of the most developed
and prosperous nations on earth—have long adhered to a relatively egalitarian conception of democracy while being less than enthusiastic (to put it mildly) toward the
American notion of rights and judicial review. Has this come at the expense of utter
disregard for civil liberties in these countries? Hardly. The sections on alleged human
rights violations in any of the Scandianivan countries are slim to nonexistent in all of
the international human rights watchdog reports—Amnesty International, Human
Rights Watch, and their various counterparts included. The status of individual
freedoms in the Netherlands—one of the European countries that, until recently, had
stringently opposed the idea and practice of judicial review—certainly has not been
lower than in the United States, which has had more than two centuries’ use of a
widely celebrated Bill of Rights and two centuries of active judicial review. As Robert
Dahl skeptically observed twenty years ago: “No one has shown that in countries such
as the Netherlands or New Zealand, which lack judicial review, or in Norway and
Sweden, where it is exercised rarely and in highly restrained fashion, or in Switzerland
where it can be applied only to cantonal legislation, are less democratic than the United
States, nor, I think could one reasonably do so.”13
Another way of assessing the significance of constitutional provisions per se is by
looking at their contribution to human development. A common definition of that
concept emphasizes access to an adequate standard of living, basic needs, services,
protections, and meaningful life opportunities. It is premised on the notion that no
one can fully enjoy or exercise any classic negative civil liberty in any meaningful way
if they lack the essentials for a healthy and decent life in the first place. According to
this notion, basic needs such as access to food and safe water, housing, education, and
health care are both morally and practically more fundamental than any given classic
negative right. One’s ability to live a decent life, to be adequately nourished, substantive equality, and to have access to basic health care, education, employment, and
shelter are essential preconditions to the enjoinment of any other rights and freedoms.
According to many sources—from the Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen and the United
Nations Human Development Program (UNDP) through to classic international
human rights texts such as the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR) and
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)—
assessing human development according to these standards is germane. Indeed, what
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these authorities demonstrate is that it is as analytically justifiable to study the effects
of constitutionalization on human development as any other definition of the ultimate
indicators of human development, including the prevalent liberal mix of procedural
justice, formal equality, and classic civil liberties (often bundled with the libertarian
addition of property rights).
The Human Development Index (HDI) is a widely recognized metric combining
standardized measures of life expectancy, literacy, educational attainment, and GDP
per capita for countries worldwide. The basic use of HDI is to rank countries by level of
“human development” on a scale of 0 to 1 (based on an updated, complicated yet reliable formula), which usually also implies whether a country is a developed, developing, or underdeveloped country. The most recent Human Development Report (2010)
ranks Norway at the top with a score of 0.938, followed by Australia, New Zealand,
the United States, Ireland, Liechtenstein, the Netherlands, Canada, Sweden, and
Germany. Finland, Iceland, and Denmark are ranked 16th, 17th, and 19th, respectively. Other countries in the top thirty include the European powerhouses (France,
Spain, Italy, and Britain) along with smaller polities, such as Greece, Belgium, Austria, Luxembourg, Israel, Slovenia, Singapore, Korea, and Hong Kong. With the
exceptions of Japan (humble constitutionalism and limited judicial review) and the
United States (extravagant constitutionalism and great judicial visibility), none of the
world’s most populated countries are among the world’s leaders in terms of human
development. Mexico, Nigeria, Brazil, Indonesia, Bangladesh, Pakistan, let alone India
and China, make strides but do not excel in terms of HDI.14 In addition to moderate population size and stable electoral processes, the existence of a developed market economy
combined with centralized planning that cherishes public investment in science, education, and health care appears to be the winning formula here. A large middle class
and a well-developed civil society—precisely what the Nordic countries exemplify—are
key societal factors. And what is the net impact of the variance on the constitutionalism
axis? Quite negligible, frankly.
In other words, anyone who points to the traditional Scandinavian antagonism
toward American-style constitutional rights and judicial review as a possible obstacle
to the full realization of democracy or human development in the Nordic countries
must take a close look at the numbers. Rights and judicial review alone certainly do
not do the trick when it comes to human development. They may not even be an
across-the-board necessary, conditio sine qua non supplement to democracy. Even
more fundamentally, comparative data from the Nordic and various other polities
suggest that factors such as manageable population size, high education and human
capital, a developed market economy alongside a functional social safety net, and
strong state capacity account for democracy, prosperity, and human development
more than written constitutionalism, active judicial review, or the legalization of
social relations. Constitutions and active judicial review matter; however, their net
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significance is often exaggerated by overly legalistic accounts, while the significance
of a constitution’s social and political context is downplayed.
Along the same lines, the Nordic countries may also serve as a springboard for
engaging in a comparative cross-disciplinary exploration of the intersection of
socioeconomic rights and political realities. The Nordic welfare-state model has long
been considered the most generous among the developed countries. The Scandinavian
welfare state has traditionally been based on social security, health care, free education, and a commitment to full employment and egalitarianism “in exchange” for high
taxation rates and levels of social expenditure.15 Welfare expenditure in the Nordic
countries is over 30 percent of the national Gross Domestic Product—the highest in
the world. In the United States, for example, that figure seldom tops 20 percent. Public
social expenditure in Sweden and Denmark is ranked first and second, respectively,
among OECD countries.16 As a result, the postwelfare transfer poverty rate in Norway,
Sweden, Finland, and Denmark has been below 5 percent of the population—by far
the lowest in the world. In the United States, by comparison, this rate hovers at around
15 percent of the population. Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Finland sport the four
lowest (respectively) Gini-coefficent readings (standardized measurements of income
inequality) among OECD countries.17 At the same time, pertinent rights provisions in
the Nordic constitutions are not more generous per se than equivalent provisions in
any of the other countries whose constitutions protect such rights. It is the realization
of these rights that matters most. The role of judicial review in fostering substantive
egalitarianism in the Nordic countries? Negligible, just as it has been with respect to
any aspect of governance other than administrative law.
Although the formal constitutional protection of positive socioeconomic rights
is supposed to advance their actual status, there is no readily apparent correlation
between these two aspects. Some countries (e.g., Brazil) have unqualified subsistence
rights provisions in their constitutions, whereas other countries (e.g., South Africa)
have qualified provisions (progressive realization, subject to available resources,
etc.). In yet other countries (e.g., India), such rights have been protected under more
generic provisions such as those of human dignity and security of the person. Despite
these differences, measurements of income inequality and standardized development
indicators are roughly similar in Brazil, South Africa, and India. Moreover, these gaps
are no smaller than those in other developing-world countries, where no subsistence
rights are granted constitutional status.
Unlike the constitutional sphere, government policy—shaped, in turn, by political
factors—seems to matter a great deal when it comes to the realization of socioeconomic
rights. Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva became president of Brazil on January 1, 2003. Lula,
as he is known popularly, has been advocating a socialist-progressive agenda. His administration introduced a series of social policies and new spending priorities aimed
at eradicating poverty and illiteracy in Brazil. The results have been nothing short
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of staggering. From 2003 to 2009, the number of poor people in Brazil dropped from
58.2 million to 41.5 million while the overall population increased from 176 million
to 198 million. The Gini-coefficient reading fell from 0.581 to 0.544; the illiteracy rate
dropped from 13.6 percent to less than 10 percent; and the infant mortality rate per
1,000 live births fell from 35.8 to 22.6.18 The social and economic rights provisions in
the Constitution of Brazil have not changed since 1988. As in the Nordic experience,
the impressive improvements in alleviating poverty in Brazil have been achieved by
targeted government policies, not by constitutional reforms or by more progressive
constitutional jurisprudence as compared to jurisprudence in the pre-Lula years.19
There are, of course, numerous other variations among countries in equalization and
poverty-reduction policies that may be derivative of differences in hegemonic cultural
propensities or demographic trends, historical and institutional path dependence,
domestic and international political economy factors, or strategic behavior by
constitutional courts vis-à-vis other political actors and/or the public.20
The sizable political economy scholarship on the modern welfare state is insightful
in addressing some of this divergence, yet it is often overlooked by (or simply unknown
to) scholars of constitutional rights and jurisprudence.21 Among the key factors in
explaining cross-country variance in the redistribution of resources are the historical
strength of the political left; the organization of labor and its relationship with the state
(corporatism); most notably, the degree of centralization of unions and their incorporation into public decision-making processes; and median-voter preferences or voter
turnout among low-income constituencies (the greater it is, the greater the redistribution level is expected).22 The relative size and type of national economy have also
been suggested as important factors shaping such coordinated bargaining arrangements, particularly the greater or lesser degree of perceived shared exposure to risk on
the international market by business and labour.23 So, for example, relatively small
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industrial countries, say the Scandinavian polities, are likely to have a more generous
welfare state so as to insure themselves against the vicissitudes of the global economy.
Yet another theory—often referred to as “varieties of capitalism”—focuses on business interests as shaped by the structure of the economy. Industries that are highly
exposed to risk will favor a relatively generous social insurance system so as to share
costs and risks with the state. It has also been argued that the burden of contemporary
welfare retrenchment is unequally borne in a systematic manner that is conditioned
by the relative (collective) strength of those who benefit from specific programs.24 If
benefits do not cut across economic and/or social cleavages, it is argued, they tend to
lack broad-based support and are more susceptible to elimination.
This literature, although marked by internal disagreement, represents a wealth of
data and analysis that could be fruitfully incorporated into the comparative study of
constitutionalism, particularly with regard to the analysis of the impact of constitutional rights guarantees and constitutional jurisprudence. Both the qualitative
and quantitative elements of this field have much to offer by way of a more holistic
approach to the comparative analysis of constitutionalism and its effects. And in
starting to address the first of the two core questions introduced earlier, one can
hardly think of a more fitting setting to study the place of socioeconomic rights in
the larger matrix of the modern welfare state than Nordic social democracy and the
Scandinavian welfare state, with its traditional emphasis on thoughtful public policy
making by elected politicians and a dedicated bureaucracy, not on full-blown constitutionalism or on government with judges.
The Nordic constitutional tradition has been variously based on local and national
democracy, popular sovereignty, parliamentary supremacy, and majority rule.25 More
broadly, it has featured a well-balanced system of government based on embedded
common sense and overall good governance, political and judicial restraint, relative
social cohesiveness, a traditional commitment to social democracy, a well-developed
welfare state combined with a vibrant market economy, and celebrated national
pride alongside global good deeds. The proof is in the pudding; as the data indicates,
all Nordic countries continuously sport top rankings in comparative global indicators
of democracy, human development, educational attainments, access to health care,
gender equality, freedom of expression, political stability, economic prosperity, and
contribution to international peacemaking. The Nordic constitutional tradition thus
presents a possible counternarrative to the emerging global consensus that regards
vibrant constitutional law and courts as the epicenter and sine qua non of any stable
political system. Looking from the outside, the Nordic countries appear to be one of the
last places on earth that need more emphasis on constitutionalism or judicial review to
sustain their well-proven record of democracy, prosperity, and human development.
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To some extent, contemporary debates in the Nordic countries concerning the democratic credentials and legitimacy of judicial review have a certain déjà vu feel to them.
While the specific content and style of these debates are distinctly Nordic, they ultimately echo similar arguments and counterarguments raised by critics and proponents
of judicial review in other polities, most notably in former Westminster-style political
systems (e.g. Canada, New Zealand, or the United Kingdom), where, much like the
Nordic countries, long-standing traditions of parliamentary sovereignty and judicial
restraint have given way to extensive constitutionalization trends. At the same time,
the increasing prevalence of rights jurisprudence and judicial review, in a region where
constitutional courts have traditionally played a limited role, provides an ideal setting
for exploring possible extrajudicial catalysts of constitutional change. In particular, the
Nordic experience may point to the significance of global forces of constitutional
convergence acting on the state from outside alongside economic liberalization and
increased political competition from within as possible catalysts of constitutionalization.
An increasingly common scenario of constitutional change is that of “incorporation,”
where the constitutionalization of rights is done via the incorporation of international
and trans- or supranational legal standards into domestic law. This scenario is particularly evident with respect to countries joining international human rights treaties
(e.g. the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
[CEDEW]) or regional human rights regimes such as the African Charter of Human
and Peoples’ Rights, the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights, or the ECHR.
Numerous such incorporations of international and trans- or supranational legal
standards into domestic law have taken place in Europe and in Latin America, most
notably, the 1994 incorporation of ten international treaties and covenants protecting fundamental human rights and civil liberties into Argentina’s domestic law
or the passing of the Human Rights Act in Britain in 1998. The European Union’s
eastward expansion of 2004 (the addition of ten new member states) and later in
2007 (with the addition of two new member states) ushered in a new constitutional
and legal era in these twelve new EU member states. In virtually all instances, such
incorporation has led to a rise in the significance of courts and to the judicialization of
politics and public policy making, more generally.26
The Nordic countries have been under the jurisdiction of the ECtHR in Strasbourg—
arguably the most prestigious, tone-setting transnational rights-jurisprudence tribunal in the world—for several decades now by virtue of being signatory parties to
the ECHR. However, it was not until the early 1990s that the five Nordic countries
formally incorporated the ECHR into their domestic constitutional regimes. The
ECHR was incorporated into Finnish law in 1990, Danish law in 1992, Swedish and
Norwegian law in 1994, and Iceland’s law in 1995. The impact on domestic law has
been transformative. One illustration is Denmark. In 1989, the ECtHR ruled in the
Hauschildt case that Denmark was in violation of certain aspects of article 6 of the
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ECHR (criminal due process rights) in allowing a judge who had decided on a suspect’s pretrial detentions to preside over the accused’s main trial.27 Within less than
a year, the Supreme Court of Denmark echoed the ECtHR’s ruling when it held in the
Jydebrode case (1990) that a judge who ordered the detention of a suspect during a
criminal investigation cannot sit on the bench that tries the accused, as this would
create judicial bias in contravention of article 6 of the ECHR.28 Since the incorporation
of 1992, still closer attention to ECHR provisions has become prevalent in both courts
and administrative bodies in Denmark.
Such incorporation of international and trans- or supranational legal standards
into domestic constitutions goes well beyond subjecting the laws of the incorporating
country to scrutiny by the judicial organs established by the incorporated international
treaty’s rights regime. It also grants domestic courts the authority to draw on provisions of the incorporated documents in scrutinizing primary legislation in their own
countries. No other region in the world, perhaps with exception of the former Eastern
bloc, has undergone such a transformative constitutional change in such a short
period of time. Unlike in the postcommunist world, however, the incorporation of the
ECHR into the Nordic countries domestic law was not accompanied by any change of
regime type or by a major economic transformation. Thus, it provides a methodologically clean setting for assessing the net impact of incorporation on constitutional jurisprudence and judicial behavior.
The globalization factor has another aspect to it. Constitutional jurisprudence in
the early twenty-first century is quite open to the international migration of ideas
(the U.S. apparent exception notwithstanding) and to foreign influence more generally. Given other broad economic, technological, and cultural convergence processes, let alone the dramatically improved availability of, and access to, comparative
constitutional jurisprudence, jurisprudential cross-fertilization and the globalization
of constitutional law seem almost inevitable.29 In a transnational age, even bastions
of insular parochialism cannot avoid a certain degree of international influence.30
However idiosyncratic or rooted in local traditions and practices a given polity’s
constitutional law may be, it is unavoidably open to liberalizing global influences.
Constitutional courts worldwide increasingly rely on comparative constitutional law
to frame and articulate their own position on a given constitutional question. This trend
has been described as “a brisk international traffic in ideas about rights,” carried on
through advanced information technologies by high-court judges from different countries.31 Indeed, “constitution interpretation across the globe is taking on an increasingly
cosmopolitan character, as comparative jurisprudence comes to assume a central
place in constitutional adjudication.”32 In short, “Courts are talking to one another all
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over the world.”33 This has given rise to what may be termed “generic constitutional
law”—a supposedly universal, Esperanto-like discourse of constitutional adjudication
and reasoning, primarily visible in the context of core civil rights and liberties.34
Precisely because the Nordic countries have long drawn on their human rights record
to bolster their international reputation, they cannot ignore the emergence of such a
universal rights discourse.
The changing nature of the domestic economic and political markets in the Nordic
countries has also been a pro-judicial empowerment vector. As with other countries with small to midsize populations, funding a generous welfare state while maintaining an investment-friendly economic environment has proven an increasingly
difficult challenge for the Nordic countries. (The meltdown of Iceland’s economy in
2008 is merely one extreme example). This challenge was given added weight by the
global trend toward social and economic neoliberalism. Over the last few decades,
calls have been made in each of the Nordic countries to shelve the local version of the
Keynesian welfare state in favor of more market-oriented, “small state” economic
policies. New or looming budgetary deficits have been used to legitimate a measured
pullback of the state from the social welfare and labor arenas. Industrial, taxation,
trade, and social policy initiatives have been used as political instruments to reestablish dominance of the market in civil society. New Zealand, Israel, Hungary, Poland,
and, let us not forget, the Thatcherite revolution in the United Kingdom are all examples of countries that underwent significant economic liberalization processes over
the last few decades. In virtually all of these countries these economic reforms leading to the rollback of big government and decline of labor unions have been accompanied by an astounding rise of rights legislation and jurisprudence.
While theorizing on the possible causal links between economic liberalization and
the rise of rights discourse may take us in various directions, one point may be made
with some confidence. There is little doubt that the canonical interpretation of rights
as predominantly negative freedoms has not done much to reduce disparities in fundamental living conditions within and among polities. It has proven virtually futile
in mitigating, let alone reversing, wide-ranging social and economic processes of
deregulation, privatization, reduced social spending, removal of “market rigidities,”
a prevalent stock-market culture, and an overarching “cult of efficiency.” It has failed
to promote the notion that no man, woman, or child can fully enjoy or exercise the
classic civil liberties in a meaningful way if they lack the basic essentials for a healthy
and decent life in the first place.35 In most postcommunist countries, for example, the
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constitutionalization of rights has been associated with precisely the opposite ethos,
placing private ownership and other economic freedoms beyond the reach of majoritarian politics and state regulation. In fact, it is difficult to find even a single recent
example in the industrial world (perhaps with the exception of post–WW II Germany)
where the rise of judicial review and individual rights discourse has been associated
with an expansion, not decline, of corporatism, organized labor, or the welfare state.
The expansion of rights talk in the Nordic countries is no exception.
In that respect, there seem to be deeper ideological links, yet to be fully fleshed
out, between the shrinkage of the Keynesian welfare state, lenient regulation,
the small-state economic and social thought prevalent in the decades prior to the
economic meltdown of 2008 and the prevalent conceptualization of rights as essentially negative liberties that shield the private sphere from the long arm of the
encroaching state. The dominant notion of rights as negative freedoms is based on
a view of society as composed of an unencumbered, autonomous, and self-sufficient
private sphere, whose members’ full realization of freedom is constantly threatened
by the encroaching state. Deregulation and privatization, so-called free and flexible
markets (that is, markets with low wage and welfare safety nets, disincentives for
collective bargaining, minimal job security, and removal of trade shields), economic
efficiency and fiscal responsibility (the latter often perceived as a call for reduced public
spending on social programs) are all fundamentals of the 1980s and 1990s orthodoxy
of economic neoliberalism. These objectives are rooted in concepts of individualism, social atomism, and existential fear of a big-brother state all of which inform the current
hegemonic discourses of rights.36
The rise of an effective transnational human rights regime in Europe is obviously
a key factor in explaining the changing nature of constitutional law in the Nordic
countries. However, the expansion of judicial power in that region may also help test
several other grand theories that purport to explain the rise of judicial review as a political or sociological, not juridical, phenomenon. To begin with, the Nordic experience
appears to pose a challenge for functionalist, systemic need-based explanations of judicial empowerment. Such theories see judicialization as emanating from the proliferation of democracy; the rise of federalism (which, in turn, necessitates the existence of
a neutral umpire);37 or as stemming from the proliferation in levels of government and
the corresponding emergence of a wide variety of semiautonomous administrative
and regulatory state agencies (independent and active judiciaries armed with judicial
review practices are seen as necessary for efficient monitoring of the ever-expanding
administrative state).38 Along the same lines, the expansion of judicial power is also
said to stem from the increasing complexity and contingency of modern societies, and/
or from the creation and expansion of the modern welfare state with its numerous
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regulatory agencies.39 Moreover, the modern administrative state embodies notions of
government as an active policy maker rather than a passive adjudicator of conflicts.
It therefore requires, so the argument goes, an active, policy-making judiciary.40
None of these macroexplanations, however, accounts for the precise timing of the
expansion of judicial power in the Nordic countries, most of which has occurred over
the last twenty-five years and had not been preceded by any major change in regime
type or transition to democracy. It is not clear why judicial review came to be seen
as necessary for the efficient monitoring of the administrative state in the last
decade of the twentieth century and not in the 1960s, say, during the hey-day of the
Scandinavian welfare-state model. Likewise, it is hard to see why the problems of complex multilevel governance and coordination reached a point where active judicial review became necessary precisely in the 1990s. Moreover, if anything, the expansion of
judicial power in the Nordic countries may be associated with economic liberalization
and the calls for less, not more, government. At best, then, functionalist factors could
provide a broad, fuzzy pro-judicialization ambience, within which key political actors
operate. Any explanation of why judicial empowerment happened in Scandinavia in
the 1990s and not thirty years earlier or later must be more concrete.
Certain accounts of the rapid growth of judicialization at the supranational judicial
level portray it as an inevitable institutional response to complex coordination problems deriving from the systemic need to adopt standardized legal norms and administrative regulations across member states in an era of converging economic markets.41
The Nordic countries offer a “natural experiment” (Sweden, Finland, and Denmark are
EU members; Norway and Iceland are not) for testing arguments about the impact of
the EU’s extensive regulatory regime on the Americanization of Europe’s way of “doing
law” (“Eurolegalism,” as Daniel Kelemen has recently called it, referring to a European
mode of what Robert Kagan had famously described as American-style “adversarial legalism”).42 A related, intriguing idea that seems worth exploring in the Nordic context,
is the possibility that economic liberalization may be an important projudicialization
catalyst as in the regulatory arena, where the combination of privatization and liberalization create regulatory gaps that, in turn, may encourage “juridical regulation.”43
The Nordic experience appears to be in line with a realist-strategic approach to the
rise of judicial review. As the seminal works of political scientists Robert McCloskey,
Robert Dahl, and Martin Shapiro (among others) established, constitutional courts and
their jurisprudence are integral elements of a larger political setting. Their establishment and behavior cannot be understood in isolation from their surrounding political
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context. Thus, the judicialization of politics may reflect the strength and unity of the political sphere more than it is reflective of courts’ and judges’ quest to expand the ambit of
their influence. For example, an extensive judicialization of politics is, ceteris paribus, less
likely to occur in a polity featuring an assertive and unified political system that is capable of restraining the judiciary. In such polities, the political sphere may signal credible
threats to an overactive judiciary that have a chilling effect on any activist tendencies of
the courts. Conversely, the more dysfunctional or deadlocked the political system and its
decision-making institutions are, in a given rule-of-law polity, the greater the likelihood
of expansive judicial power in that polity.44 Greater fragmentation of power among political branches reduces their ability to rein in the courts and, correspondingly, increases
the likelihood of courts asserting themselves.45 Indeed, the limits of judicialization in this
respect are easily analyzed through what has been termed “relative autonomy.” Since
judicialization is made possible on the basis of fissures in the political sphere, then where
these fissures are minimal, judicialization cannot proceed very far, regardless of what
the courts’ own interests or ideological preferences may be.
Taking the notion of courts as political institutions even further, recent political science
scholarship, quantitative and qualitative, suggests that political deference to the judiciary
and the consequent judicialization of politics—indeed, the profound expansion of judicial power, generally—are manifestations of the concrete social, political, and economic
struggles that shape a given political system. A core finding of this body of literature is that
strategic behavior by politicians, elites, and the courts plays a key role in explaining the
tremendous variance in the scope, nature, and timing of constitutional reform. Whereas
ideational factors may provide a platform that constrains the scope and nature of choices,
the actual form of constitutional revolutions and certainly their timing are explained by
concrete political factors. Key factors are the time-horizon or perceived threats to power
holders, the arrival of credible political competition, or a new constellation of power that
make those who operate in an insecure contractual environment, either politicians or
social groups, see the utility of constitutional protection and powerful courts.
Having opposed judicial review for most of the twentieth century, white elites
in South Africa miraculously discovered the virtues of judicial review when it became clear that the days of apartheid were numbered. Pierre Elliott Trudeau’s drive to
adopt the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms came on the heels of his electoral
defeat in 1979, the electoral rise of the separatist Parti Québécois in Quebec in 1976,
and, above all, the credible threat of a Quebec secession as signaled by the 1980 secession referendum. In Mexico, the ruling PRI could not care less about judicial review for
over seventy years but discovered its charms in the mid-1990s when credible political
opposition emerged. Israel’s Labor Movement and its predominantly secular Ashkenazi
constituencies were, for decades, agnostic toward judicial review but embraced constitutional supremacy once their cultural and electoral dominance begun to erode, their historic grip over Israel’s governing bodies faded, and new elites and their policy preferences
had gained influence. The constitutional revolution of the mid-1990s then followed.
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Conversely, little or no judicial empowerment has taken place in countries such as
Japan or Singapore, where a single political force has controlled the political system
for most of the last half century. For other nations, scholars have drawn on this
“insurance” logic to explain the variance in judicial power between, for example, different periods in the late nineteenth-century United States; between two Argentine
provinces; between postauthoritarian Asian countries (South Korea, Mongolia, and
Taiwan); between periods of single-party domination and multiparty competition
in Latin American political history; between several polities in Eastern Europe; and
between new democracies in southern Europe (Greece, Spain, and Portugal).46 A similar
logic has been drawn upon to explain the timing of various polities’ commitment to
regional human rights regimes.47
The main assertions of such a realist position—most notably, that the degree of
political uncertainty and competition facing politicians, either those on the decline or
those insecure in their newly acquired power, is an important predictor of whether or not
a constitutional court will be established—have been supported in a variety of studies ranging from formal modeling to large-N statistical analyses.48 Furthermore, its basic
premise that people tend to be risk averse under conditions of systemic uncertainty has
been advanced by a wide array of thinkers in other scholarly domains, from Rawls’s “principles of justice” agreed upon behind a veil of ignorance to Marshall Sahlins’s paradigmshifting explanation for the lack of food accumulation or storage among hunter-gatherer
societies (a perception of unlimited resources and a pervasive belief in a “giving environment”) and to Tversky and Kahneman’s seminal work on the psychology of choice.49
The emerging body of arguments concerning the political origins of constitutionalization and the construction of judicial review could be enriched considerably by
turning one’s gaze to the changing constellation of political power in the Nordic
region, the subject of this symposium. For example, in the span of thirty-six years
from 1945 to 1981, the Norwegian Labour Party—main architect of the Norwegian
welfare state—held power almost without interruption. Popular support levels for
Labour during that period reached approximately 45 to 50 percent, and parliamentary representation peaked at 85 out of 150 seats in the mid-1960s (since 2005,
the Norwegian parliament, the Storting, has had 169 seats). However, over the last
three decades, support for Labour went down considerably, plunging to a low of less
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than 25 percent in the 2001 elections before bouncing back to a 30 to 35 percent
level, more recently. During the same period, support for the libertarian right-wing
Progress Party rose from less than 45,000 votes and no seats in the 1977 elections
to more than 610,000 votes or 23% of the popular vote translated into 41 seats in
the 2009 elections. Support for the Conservative Party (Høyre, literally “right,” and
a proponent of fiscal conservatism, reduced taxation, and small-state policies), peaked
in the early to mid-1980s at just over 30 percent.50 From 1981 to 1997, governments
alternated between minority Labour governments and Conservative-led center-right
governments. The center-right governments gained power in three out of four elections
during this period (1981, 1985, 1989), whereas Labour toppled those governments
twice between elections (1986, 1990) and stayed in power after one election (1993).
It was during this period that relative judicial activism began to pick up in Norway.51
The Swedish Social Democratic Party, to pick another example, led coalition
governments in Sweden for most of the post–World War II era. However, popular support for the party has declined considerably over the last few decades. The party received
43 to 53 percent of the votes in all elections between 1940 and 1988. In the 2006 and
the 2010 elections, it received the lowest support since universal suffrage was introduced (just below 35 percent and just over 30 percent, respectively), resulting in the
loss of office to the center-right coalition Alliance for Sweden, led by the Moderate Party.
In 1976, the Social Democratic Party lost the elections for the first time in forty-four
years. The new coalition government was quick to initiate constitutional reforms “in line
with the bourgeois parties’ ambitions to strengthen the protection of fundamental rights
and freedoms.”52 The proposed reform recognized the courts’ authority to exercise judicial review. This amendment was approved in parliament in 1979 after the proconstitutionalization coalition had maintained its power in the elections held earlier that year.
Similar trends are evident in Denmark, where conservative and neoliberal political
forces have gained more popular support than in any other Nordic country. The historically hegemonic Social Democrats were the most popular political party and controlled
the government for over fifty years from World War II to 2001. It then lost power and was
in opposition for a decade until a center-left coalition regained power in the 2011 general
elections, thereby marking a major political shift in Denmark’s political market. Even in its
relatively successful 2011 electoral campaign, the once dominant Social Democrats managed to garner just a little over 25 percent of the popular vote, translating into 44 seats in
the 179-seat parliament, one seat less than its 2007 tally of 45. The Danish Liberal Party
(Venstre), which supports liberalization of the economy and lower tax rates, won over 26
percent of the popular vote in both the 2007 and the 2011 elections, making it the largest
party in the Danish parliament. The populist-nationalist right-wing Danish People’s Party
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garnered nearly 14 percent of the popular vote in 2007 and over 12 percent in 2011. The
Conservative People’s Party—another liberal-conservative party that extols the virtues of
capitalism—gained over 10 percent of the popular vote in 2007, and was a junior partner
of the Venstre-led coalition from 2001 to 2011. In short, the days of uncontested social
democratic dominance in Nordic politics are gone. And with the increased political competition and shortened time horizons of political power holders, an environment conducive
to a growth in judicial review and an expansion of the constitutional domain emerged.
The changing Nordic constitutional landscape of the last few decades seems to support other extrajudicial explanations for the judicialization of politics. In recent years,
reliance on constitutional courts worldwide to resolve core moral predicaments has
expanded its scope beyond flashy rights issues to encompass what we may term the
judicialization of “mega” politics—matters of outright and utmost political significance
that often define and divide whole polities.53 These range from the judicialization of
electoral outcomes (for example, the Bush v. Gore scenario) to ex post judicial corroboration of regime transformation (for example, the Supreme Court of Pakistan’s deep
entanglement with all six political transformations that took place in that country since
1990 alone), and from fundamental transitional justice dilemmas in postauthoritarian
settings to the judicialization of formative collective identity struggles over the very definition or raison d’être of the polity as such. Think of the Turkish Constitutional Court’s
zealous defense of militant secularism or rulings such as that of the Supreme Court of
Canada in the Quebec Secession Reference—the first time a democratic country had ever
tested in advance the legal terms of its own dissolution.
Despite the increasing prevalence of rights jurisprudence, no judicialization of
that calibre has taken place in the Nordic countries. Frequent judicial involvement
with foundational political questions remains largely foreign to the restrained Nordic
constitutional tradition. Consequently, debates over judicial appointments and the
politicization of the judiciary are not nearly so prevalent or vocal in the Nordic countries as they are in polities where an ever-accelerating judicialization of megapolitics
has taken place. To the extent that this process has taken place in the region, it has
been limited to the tension between national sovereignty and pan-Europeanism,
namely, cases where courts were asked to determine the constitutionality of apparent national sovereignty concessions made by EU accession. A notable illustration is
the Danish Supreme Court’s ruling (1998) that there was no undue concession of
constitutional sovereignty by Denmark’s accession of the Maastricht Treaty.54
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The mixed experience supports several arguments concerning the extrajudicial
vectors behind the judicialization of politics. Charles Epp suggests that the impact of
constitutional catalogues of rights may be limited by individuals’ inability to invoke
them through strategic litigation. Hence, bills of rights matter to the extent that a
support structure for legal mobilization—a nexus of rights-advocacy organizations,
rights-supportive lawyers and law schools, governmental rights-enforcement agencies and legal aid schemes—is well developed.55 In other words, while the existence of
written constitutional provisions may be a necessary condition for the effective protection of rights and liberties, it is certainly not a sufficient condition. The effectiveness
of rights provisions in planting the seeds of social change in a given polity is largely
contingent on the existence of a support structure for legal mobilization.
Although the number of lawyers in the Nordic countries has been growing steadily over
the last three decades, it remains relatively low in relation to the size of the population. As
of 2010, there is one lawyer per approximately 700 people in Norway; 1,200 in Denmark;
2,100 in Sweden; and 2,900 in Finland.56 Among OECD countries, only Japan and South
Korea feature lower ratios than Finland. By contrast, these ratios are notably higher in
more litigious societies. In Germany, for example, there is one lawyer per approximately
580 people; in the United States this increases to one per approximately 400 citizens; and
in Israel even more so to one per approximately every 200 people.57 What is more, the
number of accredited law schools remains low; in Finland, for example, there are only
three law schools, and of those only two (at the University of Helsinki and the University of
Turku) are certified by the Finnish Bar Association. In short, to the extent that the relative
size of the legal profession may be viewed as a proxy of judicialization, the Nordic countries
are notably less judicialized than most other developed democracies.
The Nordic experience of a growing prevalence of rights issues alongside limited
judicialization of core political questions also supports the argument that the judicialization of foundational collective identity questions may reflect a “constitutional disharmony” or an inherently incoherent constitutional identity, to use Gary Jacobsohn’s
terms.58 Systemic political deference to the judiciary may emanate from a disharmonic
constitutional order caused by a polity’s commitment to apparently conflicting values
(for example, Israel’s self-definition as a Jewish and democratic state or Ireland’s strong
Catholic morality and ECHR membership), or by a misfit between the values protected in a
country’s constitution contrasted with values prevalent among its populace; for example,
Turkey’s strict separation of religion and state despite the fact that the vast majority of
Turks define themselves as devout Muslims, or India’s ameliorative secularist aspirations
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4. Conclusion
As we have seen, the Nordic countries’ unique constitutional scenery is a largely unexplored paradise for theory building in the field of comparative constitutional law and politics. The region’s gradual political, economic, and constitutional transformation offers
an ideal setting—a living laboratory, as it were—for developing and testing hypotheses
about some of the core issues in the field. As the articles in this symposium illustrate, the
Nordic countries provide what is, arguably, the most fitting test case for examining the
impact of transnational law on domestic constitutionalism, with its patterns of global
convergence alongside enduring national divergence. Likewise, the Nordic experience
calls for the incorporation of comparative politics or political economy theory into the
study of constitutional law. This is particularly true with respect to the empirical examination of some core insights of post–World War II constitutional theory concerning the
origins of constitutionalization and judicial review and the critical role of the latter in
facilitating democracy and high levels of human development.
Scandinavia has been a featured case in the prolific literature on the modern welfare state and its reconstruction. Nearly eighty years ago, John Wigmore, author of
the seminal Panorama of the World’s Legal Systems (1928), suggested that: “since the
time of Sir Henry Maine, the social scientists have done a great deal in the field of comparative social institutions, but the jurists have not been so fertile in the field of comparative legal ideas.”59 He could well have been thinking about the paucity of studies
of Nordic constitutionalism when he wrote this. In spite of the Nordic countries’ great
promise, an adequate scholarly treatment of the region’s constitutional transformation and its lessons for constitutional theory has materialized only partially. Scholars
of comparative constitutionalism would be well advised to take a closer look at the
Nordic countries. Satisfaction is guaranteed!
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advanced against a religion-laden sociopolitical reality. No existential disharmonies of that
nature exist in the Nordic countries. Thus, to the extent that a judicialization of politics has
taken place in the region, it has been confined to rights jurisprudence but has not extended
to core political dilemmas. It remains to be seen whether the increasingly heated debates
over immigration policy, the future of the Nordic welfare state, and the region’s place in a
transnational Europe will bring about increased judicialization of these issues.
Theories that emphasize the needs of systemic coordination, the rise of the
adminstrative state, federalism, or democratization as the main reasons for the rise
of judicial review do not have much explanatory power in the Nordic context.
By contrast, the evidence suggests that a combination of powerful transnational
pressures, mainly economic liberalization and the impact of European rights instruments, alongside the decline of pro–social democratic parties and the transformation
of domestic electoral markets generally, are the main catalysts behind the changing
landscape of Nordic constitutionalism.

